Programs that encourage the participation of disadvantaged business enterprises (DBE) as subcontractors have been a part of government procurement auctions for over three decades. In this paper, we examine the impact of a program that requires prime contractors to subcontract out a portion of a highway procurement project to DBE fi rms. We study how DBE subcontracting requirements affect bidding behavior in federally funded projects. Within a symmetric independent private value framework, we use the equilibrium bidding function to obtain the cost distribution of fi rms undertaking projects either with or without subcontracting goals. We then use nonparametric estimation methodsto uncover and compare the cost of fi rms bidding on a class of asphalt projects related to surface treatment in Texas. The analysis shows little differences in the cost structure between auctions that have subcontracting goals and those that do not.
Introduction
Minority preference policies have been a part of government procurement programs in the United States since the late 1960's. Their goal is to enhance the opportunities of minority businesses and counter the e¤ects of past discrimination. Critics of these policies claim that they result in reverse discrimination, limit competition, and raise project costs. 1 Two incentive schemes have been used widely thus far -rules requiring participation of minority …rms as subcontractors and bid preference programs. 2 Our analysis focuses on the former, policies that set minority …rm participation goals. Speci…cally, these rules require that prime contractors subcontract out a set percentage of the overall value of a project to minority …rms. Such a requirement could a¤ect the prime contractor's make-or-buy decisions in two ways. First, it may in ‡uence the overall level of subcontracting a …rm uses on a project and, second, it may in ‡uence who the …rm subcontracts with on a project. Both instances impose constraints on the prime contractors, potentially raising projects costs. This paper examines whether project costs di¤er between auctions that have subcontracting goals and auctions without such goals. The paper employs a structural auction model to infer contractors' costs from observed bids in order to compare the costs across project types. Nonparametric methods developed by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Haile, Hong and Shum (2006) are used to estimate the distribution of latent costs, allowing us to control for project heterogeneity and selection. Papers by Marion (2007) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2007) also use a structural auction approach to examine bid preference schemes for small businesses; however, these papers do not examine environments where subcontracting goals are implemented. To be sure, our empirical analysis is not an evaluation of the program itself, as the program has been in place for several decades. Rather the structural model 1 See Holzer and Neumark (2000) for an overview of a¢ rmative action programs and how they a¤ect small and disadvantaged businesses.
2 Bid preference programs give explicit advantage to small and minority bidders in auctions. For example, in the case of California state highway contracts with bid preferences analyzed by Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2007) , small business are awarded a contract if they are within 5% of the low bid.
is employed to quantify di¤erences in costs across projects with and without subcontracting goals.
The empirical setting is …rst-price sealed bid auctions for highway construction projects let in Texas over the period 1998-2007. 3 Our …ndings show that, once project heterogeneity and bidder participation are controlled for, there is little di¤erence in costs between projects that are assigned subcontracting goals and projects that are not assigned such goals. When we examine an even more homogeneous sample of projects, we …nd even greater similarity in costs between the two project groups. We also construct estimates of the markup of the bid above the cost and …nd that the magnitude of the markup is consistent with that reported in the literature and varies little between auctions with and without subcontracting requirements.
The e¤ect of minority preference policies on bidding and costs have been examined in recent studies. Several papers deal with bid preference schemes. Denes (1997) compares bids submitted between solicitations restricted to small businesses and unrestricted solicitations.
He …nds that bids are no higher in restricted solicitations. 4 Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2007) analyze bid preference programs in California highway procurement by examining how bidding and participation decisions are a¤ected by a program that provides preferential treatment to small …rms. They …nd that the preferential treatment of small businesses creates losses in e¢ ciency (since the small …rms have higher costs on average) but no change in the overall cost of procurement. In a related study of the California state procurement auctions, Marion (2007) found that the distortion in participation patterns in bid preference programs is responsible for a 3.8 percent increase in the cost of the winning …rm. Despite this evidence, the e¤ect of such programs on the state's cost is ambiguous. By invoking bid preferences the state gives an advantage to minority bidders and compels the non-minority bidders to bid more aggressively 3 Our structural analysis only includes asphalt paving projects, as we focus on a relatively homogeneous set of projects and include those that best match the assumptions of the independent private value environment. Papers such as Bajari and Ye (2003) also focus on subsets of construction projects in order to achieve greater homogeneity in the items under study. 4 Other studies that have been done focus on whether companies that bene…t from a¢ rmative action in procurement continue to succeed after the programs are no longer in e¤ect (Holzer and Neumark, 2000) .
and win contracts at a lower bid. At the same time, since the competitive pressure is reduced for minority bidders they bid less aggressively than otherwise; and when the item is awarded to them, they impose additional cost on the state (McAfee and McMillan, (1989) and Maskin and Riley, (2000) ).
The potential for e¢ ciency distortions is di¤erent for programs setting minority subcontracting goals. These programs are widely used in federal procurement contracts and may constrain the make-or-buy decision of prime contractors. E¢ ciency distortions could be introduced due to potentially less e¢ cient production of tasks by subcontractors compared to the prime contractor, to the use of less e¢ cient subcontractors on subcontracted tasks, or to changes in competition intensity in the subcontracting market. Marion (2009) using data from the California Department of Transportation spanning the period between 1996 and 1999 shows that the subcontracting goals set for highway construction contracts in California raise disadvantaged business enterprise usage signi…cantly, so that the constraints appear to bind.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the disadvantaged business enterprise program and provides an overview of the data. Section 3 presents the model and structural empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
Texas Auctions and Bidding Patterns

Data Description
Our analysis utilizes data on auctions and bidding from the state of Texas. The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) holds regularly scheduled highway procurement auctions that incorporate goals for the awarding of subcontracts to disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs). DBEs are small businesses that are owned and controlled by members of a minority group including women-owned businesses. For selected federally-funded projects, TxDOT assigns a proportion of the contract value that must be performed by DBEs. and 2007 -all projects and paving projects. 5 Since paving projects are the focus of the empirical analysis that follows, we provide a separate breakout for this group of projects. Across all projects, the DBE goals range from zero to 15 percent with about two-thirds of projects having DBE goals above zero. Paving projects make up about one half of the overall number of projects.
As in other states, the Department of Transportation in Texas chooses which projects to assign DBE status and the level of the DBE goal for each project. The state makes its decisions by considering a number of factors including -the type of project (asphalt, bridgework, etc.) , the geographic location of the project, and the availability of pre-quali…ed DBE subcontractors in locations that can do speci…c tasks. TxDOT has a separate o¢ ce that manages these assignments, which is distinct from the o¢ ces that design, cost out, and let 5 The sample is restricted to federally-funded projects that are estimated to cost in excess of $400,000, as TxDOT only considers projects that are estimated to cost at least $400,000 for assignment of DBE goals. State funded projects do not have DBE goals. The TxDOT bid data that we have access to contain information on all road construction projects o¤ered for bid letting in Texas for the period from September, 1998 through August, 2007 Our empirical analysis focuses on paving projects, a relatively homogeneous group of projects that previous studies have shown …t the independent private values framework well.
Projects are auctioned o¤ on a monthly basis using a …rst-price, sealed-bid format. For each project, we have the date of the bid letting, information on the location of the project, an overall description of the project, a detailed list of the tasks involved, the estimated length of the project (in calendar days), the state's engineering estimate of the project's total cost, whether the project is federally or state funded, and the DBE participation requirement. State 6 The structure of the DBE program changed during our sample period, as the U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) moved toward more race-neutral approaches to meet DBE subcontracting objectives. In an earlier version of the paper, we tested for di¤erences in bidding behavior associated with changes in how the DBE program was administered. We found no evidence of a change in bidding in DBE vs. non-DBE auctions in response to such program changes. 
Bidding Regression Results
To further explore the patterns related to DBE status, we present a set of descriptive regressions where the dependent variable is the log of the bid submitted by an individual bidder.
All models include a common set of basic project characteristics, including controls for the DBE status of the auction, project size (measured as the log of the engineering estimate), project location and time e¤ects. 8 In some speci…cations, we also control for project characteristics including -project length (log of the calendar days to complete a project), project type (shares of speci…c material components), and the number of project components. The last variable has been used in a number of studies to proxy for the complexity of the project.
To control for bidder cost heterogeneity, variables that measure a bidder's backlog of projects and the distance to a project are included. A list of variable de…nitions is presented in Column 4 includes all the regressors in Column 3 but replaces the zero-one indicator variable for DBE with a set of dummy variables that capture di¤erences in the level of DBE goals across projects. The model includes four dummy variables for the DBE groupings reported in Figure 2 .2 and the omitted category represents the state projects. None of the DBE coe¢ cients is statistically signi…cant and all are close to zero in magnitude. Moreover, there is no rise in the coe¢ cients as the DBE goal increases, as one might expect if higher DBE goals were forcing prime contractors to subcontract more activity to less e¢ cient producers of a task. 9
How should we interpret the results on complexity and DBE status of projects? TXDOT assigns DBE goals based, in part, on the tasks involved in a project. Projects with a large number of tasks are more likely to have tasks appropriate for DBE subcontracting. Thus, if the state always assigned DBE status to complex projects, then our regressions would not be able to distinguish the di¤erences in bidding due to complexity from di¤erences in bidding due to DBE requirements. One way to see if the positive e¤ect of complexity is merely proxying for DBE status is to examine complexity's correlation with bids in state projects. State projects are not assigned DBE goals but we can still measure the number of tasks for these projects. Column (5) of Table 2 .2 presents the results of a model that includes an interaction term between a state project indicator variable and the log of complexity. This interaction term tests whether there is any di¤erence in the relationship between bids and complexity for state versus federal projects. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term is essentially zero (0.002) and not statistically signi…cant. This shows that the relationship between complexity and bids is similar in state and federal projects, suggesting that the correlation between bids and complexity is not being driven by the DBE assignment process. Rather the correlation likely re ‡ects the increase in costs associated with doing more complicated projects.
One potential problem with the above analysis is that it requires that the engineer's cost estimate not be in ‡uenced by DBE assignment. In Texas, the o¢ ce that assigns DBE goals to auctions is clearly distinct from the parties responsible for designing and costing out a project.
In addition, the setting of a project's DBE goal occurs only after a project's cost is estimated.
So, DBE assignment of a project does not in ‡uence the engineer's cost estimate for the project.
However, in estimating project costs, TXDOT can use information from prior bid submissions to estimate the costs of speci…c project components. 10 A problem with our analysis would arise if some project tasks are only performed by DBE …rms and only occur in DBE auctions.
E¤ectively there would be no cost di¤erential to estimate in this circumstance, as di¤erences in costs due to DBE subcontracting would simply be re ‡ected in the engineer's cost estimate in DBE projects. Moreover, we do know that the o¢ ce that makes DBE assignments does consider the task list in making DBE assignments. The tasks considered most suited to DBEs in Texas are listed in Table A .2 in the appendix. Table A .2 shows the frequency of each task broken out by federal auctions with DBE goals, federal auctions without DBE goals, and state projects. The speci…c bid items presented center around landscape, tra¢ c control and miscellaneous construction activities. 11 Importantly, the frequency data show that these DBE tasks are not limited to DBE auctions. State projects that are not assigned DBE goals, also incorporate these tasks, and so do federal non-DBE projects. In general, we see that roughly 57% of these DBE tasks are in DBE projects while 43% are in non-DBE projects.
These project percentages are similar to the overall percentage of bid items across DBE and non-DBE projects (60% vs. 40%). Thus, there does not appear to be a specialized group of tasks that only occur in DBE projects.
Overall, the bidding patterns suggest little di¤erence in bids submitted in auctions with DBE goals compared to auctions without DBE goals. However, these descriptive regressions do not control for the competitive environment or for such features as selection into the auctions. In the next section, we employ a structural approach that will allow us to control for competition, entry into the auctions and generate estimates of the latent cost distributions for bidders participating both in DBE and non-DBE auctions.
Structural Analysis
This section uses nonparametric estimation methods to uncover the cost of …rms bidding in procurement auctions. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we outline a simple bidding model.
Model
There are n risk neutral bidders who compete for a government contract in a …rst price sealed bid auction where the low bidder is awarded the contract. There are two types of projects, indexed by j, those that have no subcontracting goals and those that do (i.e., j = f0; 1g).
The cost of contract j to a bidder i, is private and denoted by c ij . The density of the private cost c ij is f j and is strictly positive on the support [c L j ; c H j ]. In a procurement auction, a bidder who is awarded contract j at a bid of b ij receives a net pro…t of b ij c ij . Each bidder is maximizing expected pro…t given by:
In the symmetric independent private value (IPV) case, the equilibrium bid function is
where
Notice that the cost of the contract consists of the sum of the cost of various tasks comprising the project, some or potentially all of which may be undertaken by the primary contractor.
In projects having subcontractor participation goals, a number of tasks representing a minimum percentage of the estimated cost, have to be undertaken by DBE subcontractors. We ask if there is a di¤erence in bidding distributions between projects that have subcontracting goals in place and those that do not and whether the combined cost of the project is di¤erent across j 0 s. It is obvious that, if the minority subcontractors are less e¢ cient they will impose a cost to the state agency.
Within the symmetric independent private value framework, we use the equilibrium bidding function (3.1) to obtain the cost distribution of …rms undertaking projects either with subcontracting goals or without subcontracting goals. Let G 0 (b) be the distribution function of bids in projects without subcontracting goals and G 1 (b) the distribution function of bids in projects with subcontracting goals. Let g 0 (b) and g 1 (b) be the associated densities. Considering the standard monotonicity condition imposed on the equilibrium bid function (c),
If we substitute these expressions into the equilibrium bidding function, we …nd that the latent cost of undertaking a project without subcontracting goals can be written as,
where n 0 is the number of …rms bidding in projects without subcontracting goals. Similarly, the latent cost associated with a project that has subcontracting goals is,
where n 1 is the number of …rms bidding in projects with subcontracting goals. The right hand side of these equations can be estimated with nonparametric methods using the observed vector of bids.
Asphalt project data
The identi…cation and estimation of equations (3.2) and (3.3) rely on the assumptions associated to the IPV framework, which are tested in Section 3.4. We require a sample of 13 projects that are relatively homogeneous and …t the IPV framework. From related literature (see Bajari and Ye (2003) , De Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge, and Kosmopoulou (2008) ) and our discussions with state highway and civil engineers, we believe that asphalt projects appear to best match these requirements. Asphalt projects rely more on the individual …rm's state of equipment and internal e¢ ciency to determine the cost and are relatively homogeneous.
Although asphalt projects are less heterogeneous than the full sample of paving projects used in Section 2, they may include work on non-asphalt components such as bridge, subgrade, etc. We made two adjustments to the sample to obtain an even more homogeneous set of projects. First, we restrict attention to asphalt paving projects with an estimated cost between 1 million and 20 millions, with an asphalt material share higher than 50 percent of the engineer's cost estimate, and with bridge and earthwork components of less than 5 percent. Bridge and earthwork components introduce uncertainty in the cost that is likely more common to all bidders. We also restricted the sample to projects with no subgrade and base course tasks. 12 Those tasks introduce common uncertainty in costs and appear most often in the construction of new roads. We present descriptive statistics for this sample in the …rst four columns of Table 3 .1 (we call this sample Asphalt Projects). We consider the sample for all levels of participation in the …rst two columns and a subsample with 3 and 4 bidders in the next two columns. In the empirical analysis that follows, we will focus on samples with similar number of bidders. Second, we construct a more selected sample of contracts that relates exclusively to surface treatment. 13 The descriptive statistics for this sample are presented in the last four columns of 
Nonparametric estimation and auction heterogeneity
Standard non-parametric methods can be used to estimate (1 G(bjx))=g(bjx), where the vector x 2 X R p includes variables capturing observed project heterogeneity (e.g., Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong 2000). We incorporate auction speci…c characteristics replacing the unconditional distribution functions G j (b) and g j (b) in equations (3.2) and (3.3) by conditional distributions of a form G j (bjx) and g j (bjx), where x includes the engineer's cost estimate as in Marion (2007) . These conditional functions can be estimated by considering the empirical ver-
and the following estimators de…ned in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000):
where 1 f g is an indicator function, K g ( ); K G ( ); and K f ( ) are continuously di¤erentiable kernel functions de…ned over a compact support, and h g ; h G ; and h f are the associated bandwidths. Several kernels satisfy these conditions, including the triweight kernel,
We use this triweight kernel to estimate the density f j (x j ) and the distribution function G j (b j ; x j ). Moreover, we consider the product of two triweight kernels for estimating the density g j (b j ; x j ). Both the rates in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and the factors associated with the choice of the triweight kernel (see, e.g, Härdle 1991) suggest employing bandwidths of the form h jG = c^ (b j )(nL j ) 1=5 , h jg = c^ (b j )(nL j ) 1=6 , and h jf = c^ (x j )(nL j ) 1=5 ; where (b) is de…ned as the standard deviation of b and c = 2:978 1:06.
Given the potential bene…ts of using the logarithm of bids rather than bids, we consider the logarithmic transformation for the variable of interest c j (see Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) , and Marion (2007)). We de…ne the pseudo costĉ as follows:
where the variables a j = log(b j ); z j = log(x j ), and
The upper bound of the support includes a variable a j max de…ned as maxfa j1 ; :::a jnL j g: In the …rst stage, we now use equation (3.4) to obtainĉ 0 andĉ 1 ; and in the second stage, we use these pseudo costs and the engineer's cost estimate to estimate the conditional distributionŝ
Figure 3.1 presents the conditional densities evaluated at the median of the engineer's cost estimate. These empirical distributions were obtained considering the samples described in Table 3 .1. The continuous lines show kernel density estimates for the cost of …rms bidding in projects without subcontracting goals (non-DBE), and the dashed line present estimates for the cost of …rms bidding in projects with subcontracting goals (DBE). Because the bid's distributions are not comparable in cases of di¤erent number of bidders, we estimate the vector of pseudo costĉ j separately for 3 and 4 bidders. Then, we pool the values for di¤erent number of bidders to estimate the conditional density of costĝ j (ĉ j jx j ). The upper panel in Figure 3 .1 shows that the cost distributions of …rms bidding in asphalt projects when small bridge and earthwork components are present in the project, and the lower panel presents results from the sample of surface treatment projects. The distribution of …rms undertaking DBE projects is shifted to the right, suggesting the possibility that the program generated ine¢ ciencies. However, when we consider the more homogeneous sample of asphalt surface treatment projects, the di¤erences in the cost distributions tend to disappear. 
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In our application, one needs to control for many auction-speci…c characteristics. Recall that the e¤ects of project size, project complexity, and project length are statistically signi…-cant in all variants of the model estimated in Table 2 .2. It is natural then to use the estimation method proposed by Haile, Hong and Shum (2006) . The advantage of their approach relative to the approach developed by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) is that it enables one to control for many auction-speci…c characteristics without increasing the sample size. The basic idea is to impose an additively separable structure on how observable factors x and latent auction heterogeneity w a¤ect costs.
Consider the function : X W ! R, and 9(x 0 ; w 0 ) 2 X W R where z is a vector of instruments and w is an index that includes unobserved factors independent of x. In this paper, we take a control variate approach, estimating w = n (x; z)
as suggested in Haile, Hong and Shum (2006) .
We use a non-parametric approach to estimate
We obtainŵ after estimating (3.5) by censored quantile regression. We use the number of .2) and (3.3) using the homogenized bids, and the following estimators,
where, as before, 1 f g is an indicator function, L denotes the number of auctions, K( ) is a continuously di¤erentiable kernel function de…ned over a compact support, and h is a properly chosen bandwidth. We use the triweight kernel de…ned above. Cost densities for DBE and non-DBE projects. The densities were obtained using non-parametric methods employed on a sample of homogenized bids. These bids were obtained considering a parametric model that include auction speci…c characteristics as covariates and a control variate function. While the chart at the top is obtained using the sample of asphalt projects, the chart at the bottom is obtained using the sample of surface treatment projects. 
Surface Treatment
Cost -millions of dollars- Table 3 .2: Variability bands for the estimated densities in Figure 3 .2. The intervals were constructed considering a block bootstrap procedure. The quantiles are in millions, and we considered 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. DBE stands for disadvantage business enterprises.
are negligible. 15 At …rst glance, the results presented in Figure 3 .2 indicate that the cost distributions may not be signi…cantly di¤erent. To examine this further, we provide 95 percent variability bands for several quantiles of the cost distributions in Table 3 .2. Because the homogenized bids are based on estimates obtained in a …rst stage, standard pointwise con…dence intervals for the densities cannot be used. Alternatively, we can use the bootstrap to provide a measure of the variability of the estimates (see, e.g., Pagan and Ullah 1999). Speci…cally, a bootstrap procedure is implemented as follows. 16;17 We draw an auction from a sample of projects and we include all bidders for that project. We continue sampling projects with replacement until we obtain a sample of L projects. Using this sample, we estimate (x;w). We then construct the homogenized bidsb 0 , separately for 3 and 4 bidders. Using these samples of bids, we compute the estimates of the DBE and non-DBE densities. We iterate the procedure 10,000 times. We …nally construct pointwise 95 percent variability bands from the quantiles of the empirical distributions. The results of the table suggest that the DBE and non-DBE distributions are 1 5 The motivation of controlling for endogenous participation is associated with projects with small bridge and earthwork components. We also compared the pseudo-cost distributions assuming that unobserved heterogeneity does not a¤ect the identi…cation of equations (3.2) and (3.3). After controlling for observed heterogeneity by estimating (x), we obtained costs distributions that were similar to the ones presented in Figure 3 .2.
1 6 Other bootstrap procedures have been implemented in the literature (see, e.g., Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) and Krasnokutskaya (2010) ). Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) use a slightly di¤erent bootstrap procedure. To investigate the performance of our empirical strategy, we construct estimates of the median bidders' markup (b ĉ)=b in auctions with 3, 4, 5, and 6 bidders. Extending the previous analysis to include auctions with 5 and 6 bidders allows us to examine in more detail the markups generated by the approach. the levels documented in the literature (see, e.g., Bajari and Ye (2003) ), varying between 2 and 11 percent. Lastly, the downslopes show the e¤ect of competition on markups in these procurement auctions.
Testing the IPV assumptions
Our analysis was performed using the symmetric independent private value framework, which essentially implies that exchangeability of marginal distributions and independence (Athey and Haile (2007) ). Under exogenous variation of bidders, this framework suggests that the marginal distributions for n = 3 and n = 4 must be equal, because the costs are invariant to n (Lemma 1, Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006) ).
In Table 3 .3, we present evidence on estimates for the marginal distributions of projects with di¤erent number of bidders. While the columns marked as (1) provide p-values corresponding to Wilcoxon tests, the columns marked as (2) provide p-values corresponding to Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. 19 The …rst statistic is a common test suggested in the literature to evaluate di¤erence in location, and it is applied to evaluate if the costs distributions have same locations. The second statistic is a test for independence, and it is applied in this case to evaluate if the cost distributions in auctions with 3 and 4 bidders are signi…cantly di¤erent.
The testing procedures are described in the Appendix.
The tests seem to suggest that the sample of projects exclusively related to surface treatment …ts the framework better. The costs distributions obtained using the surface treatment projects vary less in the number of bidders, and therefore, they appear to satisfy the condition on the marginal distributions associated to the IPV framework.
The IPV framework also relies on the independence of the bids submitted to an auction.
We employed three testing procedures to evaluate conditional independence on pairs of bids 
Additional Considerations on Selection Issues
The previous analysis shows that there is little di¤erence in project costs between projects that are assigned subcontracting goals versus projects that are not assigned goals. This section discusses a few additional issues associated with bidder's participation and project heterogeneity. We previously addressed endogenous participation in ‡uenced by project unobserved heterogeneity using the method proposed by Haile, Hong and Shum (2006) . In the analysis of the DBE program however, one needs to consider that the program may a¤ect costs, and therefore, the participation of bidders in an auction. The DBE program might be a¤ecting participation in auctions with and without DBE subcontracting goals. In order to address this issue, we restricted attention to bidders participating in both DBE and non-DBE auctions.
Therefore, our previous results might not be a¤ected by bidder's selection issues. 20;21 A more important issue seems to be associated with DBE assignments. As we discussed earlier, it is likely that the state would assign DBE status to a project with a large number of tasks involved. 22;23 The possibility of this type of selection bias could be incorporated into the analysis by replacing the selection probability by a non parametric function (Das, Newey, and Vella 2003) . A more convenient approach for this setting with a relatively large number of covariates, is to estimate the selection probability by the propensity score. The propensity score s is the conditional probability of selection estimated by standard parametric models (e.g., probit). We use the total number of bid items in a project, the number of days to complete the project and indicators for the location of the project to estimate the conditional probability of selection. We observe that these …rst two e¤ects have the expected sign and are signi…cant at 5 percent. To obtain the homogenized bid, we now condition onŝ, and therefore the …rst stage regression is now b =~ (x;ŵ;ŝ) + u. The panels in Figure 3 .4 present estimates of 3.2 and 3.3 that use these samples of bidsb 0 . After controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity and the possibility of selection bias, we again …nd that the costs 2 0 The samples of asphalt projects and surface treatment projects presented in Table 3 .1 exclude bidders who participated in DBE or non-DBE auctions alone. The vast majority of bidders participate in both auctions. The asphalt sample includes 84 percent of all bidders participating in the auctions throughout the period of analysis, and the surface treatment sample includes 82 percent of all bidders. Although the sample sizes are reduced, these sample re…nements minimize and potentially eliminate issues associated with bidder's participation.
2 1 As a robustness check, we also estimated the models including all bidders. Our …ndings revealed that the results presented in this paper are not a¤ected dramatically. We continued to …nd small di¤erences in costs in the asphalt sample and no apparent di¤erences in costs in the surface treatment sample. The mark-ups ranged from 2 to 10 percent, as in Figure 3 .3. We do not present the results to avoid repetition, but they are available upon request.
2 2 A natural concern in the …rst stage regression is the suspected endogenous indicator for DBE assignment (see, e.g., Marion 2010). It is important to note that by the nature of the exercise, the …rst stage regression does not include a suspected endogenous variable, but of course, the non-random assignment j = f0; 1g may create biases.
2 3 More formally, the state would assign DBE status to a project if 1fd 0 + > 0g, where 1f g is an indicator function. The vector d includes the total number of bid items (project components) in a project and the availability of minority …rms given by the geographic location of the project. The variable is assumed to be an error term that could be correlated with the error term in the model for b but it is independent of d. Because in the …rst stage b =~ (x;ŵ) + u, it is then possible that Efujx; w; d 0 > g 6 = 0 generates selection bias even in the case that u ? x. Although they seem to represent two di¤erent issues, addressing observed heterogeneity is related in our case to correcting for selection bias. For identical projects with characteristics (x 0 0 ;w0) 0 , one would expect~ (x;w) = (x;w) (x0;w0) = 0, and also Efujx; w; d 0 > g = 0, simply because d 0 would tend to be constant. 
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Cost -millions of dollarsDensity Non DBE DBE distributions present small di¤erences, which turn out to be negligible when we consider the sample of surface treatment projects.
Conclusion
This paper examines the di¤erences in bidding and costs between projects that have subcontracting goals and projects that do not. The analysis uses the nonparametric structural approach developed by Haile, Hong and Shum (2006) that allows one to control for many auction-speci…c characteristics and endogenous participation without increasing sample size. This is particularly important in our setting as project size, complexity, materials use and other characteristics vary markedly across projects. Our empirical results show little di¤erence in the level of bids submitted or in the estimated costs between projects with subcontracting goals and projects without such goals. When we utilize an even more homogeneous sample of projects, the di¤erences are even less. Finally, we show that the implied markups generated from the Haile, Hong and Shum approach are consistent with those reported in the literature and do not di¤er substantially for auctions with and without subcontracting goals.
A simple interpretation of the result is that the supply and quality of DBE subcontractors was su¢ cient during our period of analysis so that prime contractors were e¤ectively unrestricted in their bidding due to the presence of DBE requirements. The Census Bureau's 2002 Survey of Business Owners indicates that Texas has a relatively large number of minorityowned construction …rms in comparison to the average state, re ‡ecting, at least in part, the large minority population of the state. Moreover, our …ndings do not necessarily mean the program has had no e¤ects on contracting. The program may have encouraged the formation and success of minority and women-owned businesses increasing the supply of DBE subcontractors, something that we cannot test with our data. Alternatively, the program may have a¤ected project costs but the e¤ects may have occurred outside our window of observation. Speci…cally, they may have occurred when the program was introduced -several decades 28 before our period of analysis. That said, our results suggest that during the period under study DBE subcontracting requirements did not substantially raise the bids or costs of prime contractors.
A Appendix
A.1 Testing Procedures
Let f(Z i ; V i )g n i=1 be random samples with densities g Z , g V , and joint density f (z; v). Hájek, Šidák, and Sen (1999) suggest the following tests for independence and location.
1. B test: This test, which was employed in Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003) , was proposed by Blum et al. (1961) . The test statistic is equal to,
where F (z; v) = n 1
. This test is consistent and distribution free.
2. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: Using the previous de…nitions, we can write this test as
3. Wilcoxon rank test: We set Z n+j = V j for j = 1; :::n and N = 2n. Let R i (i = 1; :::N ) be the rank of the observation Z i in the ordered sequence Z (1) < Z (2) < ::: < Z (N ) .
This test is based on the statistic S = n P i=1 R i . Another form of the test is called MannWhitney statistic, which is based on the number of pairs (Z i ; V i ) such that Z i < V j .
Under the null hypothesis of no di¤erences in location, the standardized version of S is asymptotically normal as n ! 1.
4. Kendall rank correlation test: Let R i (i = 1; :::n) be the rank of the observation Z i in the ordered sequence Z (1) < Z (2) < ::: < Z (n) and Q i (i = 1; :::n) be the rank of the observation V i in the ordered sequence V (1) < V (2) < ::: < V (n): . This test is based on the following statistic: = (n(n 1)) 1 P TxDOT divides Texas into …ve major geographic zones. We identify these zones using zone dummies Material shares for They include mainly surfacing, earthwork, miscellaneous construction, asphalt projects drainage and foundation structures, subgrade and base, and tra¢ c. Distance to the project The distance between the county the project is located in and the location distance to the county of the …rm's location [log(distance+1)] Backlog It is constructed by summing across the non-completed value of the contract of existing contracts. The variable is similar to the variables used by Bajari and Ye (2003) and Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) . 
